

Course

Analytic Philosophy

Term

Spring Semester 2020

Teacher

Sebastian Sunday Grève (ssg@pku.edu.cn)

Location

Weeks 1–16, Tuesdays, 15:10–18:00, 二教 507 (to be confirmed)

Level

Open to all undergraduate and graduate students; no prior philosophical knowledge required

Description

Analytic philosophy is the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world, and it is now steadily growing in the non-English-speaking world. This course is a detailed study of the analytic tradition—its nature, history and practice—and it will help to transform students into better, more analytic philosophers.

The course will offer an introduction to the great works of early analytic philosophy by Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), G. E. Moore (1873–1958), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) as well as excellent recent and contemporary work in analytic philosophy ranging from epistemology and metaphysics to ethics, aesthetics, and more.

Format

The course will be a mix of lecture, seminar and workshop. The focus during workshop sessions will be on the acquisition, or improvement, of philosophical writing and dialogue skills. Throughout the term, students will write essays of various lengths in response to questions that are set by the teacher; work on alternative questions may be agreed in consultation with the teacher. Students will receive written teacher feedback on each required piece of written work that they submit by the end of Week 16, shortly after submitting it.

Marking

A student's individual marks for the various marked requirements will be weighted in such a way that the student's highest scores will be assigned the maximal percentage according to the stipulations given below (see Requirements).

Requirements

Completion of assigned reading prior to class

Regular attendance

Class participation (10–20% of the overall course mark)

One five-to-ten-minute class presentation (10–20%)

Three 500-word essays, or equivalent (see Options), during term (two strongest essays, 10–20%)

Two sets of written comments on another student's 1,000-word essay, during term

Three 1,000-word essays, or equivalent (see Options), during term (20–30%)

One draft, min. 1,000 words, of the end-of-term essay, prior to Week 16

One 2,500-word essay at the end of term (30–40%)

[Justified special needs of individual students will be met at the discretion of the department.]

Options

Students may revise and resubmit each of their 1,000-word essays once before the end of term, if they wish to improve their initial marks. In consultation with the teacher, students may also present work equivalent to one or more 500-word or 1,000-word essays instead of an essay (or essays), for example, class presentation, discussion with the teacher during office hours, collaborative writing, debating, poetry, music, film, performance, public engagement or experimental philosophy. The 2,500-word essay, and the required draft of it, may be based on one of the three marked 1,000-word-essays.

Note on the schedule of readings

Starred readings (*) are essential, and should be read prior to the first meeting on a given topic and prior to attempting an essay on it. Students who wish to read more of the main readings for any given topic are advised to follow the order given below.

Suggested background and further readings are optional and will not be the focus of class discussion; background readings are typically of an introductory nature, while further readings tend to offer more detailed discussion on some central issues.

All main readings, and most others, will be made available in electronic form by the teacher. More suggested background and further readings may be added as the course progresses.

Topics are given in the chronological order according to which the course will proceed. However, there is no strict pre-set weekly progression plan: we will aim to complete each topic within one course meeting, but we will also make sure to cover each topic sufficiently before moving on to the next. More topics will be added, if we succeed in this aim. Week 1 will be an introductory meeting, for which no preparation will be required.

Topic 1 (Knowledge) [Week 2]

*Gettier, Edmund. 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', *Analysis* 23 (1963), 121–3

*Blome-Tillmann, Michael. 'The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge', *Analysis* 67 (2007), 214–19

*Kearns, Stephen. 'In Praise of Folly: A Reply to Blome-Tillmann', *Analysis* 67 (2007), 219–22

Zagzebski, Linda. 'The Inescapability of Gettier Problems', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 44 (1994), 65–73

Background

Jenkins Ichikawa, Jonathan and Steup, Matthias. 'The Analysis of Knowledge', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Further

Williamson, Timothy. 'Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic', *Inquiry* 56 (2013), 1–14

Williamson, Timothy. *Knowledge and Its Limits* (Oxford UP, 2000), esp. chapters 1 and 2

Topic 2 (Meaning)

*Frege, Gottlob. 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung', *Zeitung für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 100 (1892), 25–50; translated as 'On Sinn and Bedeutung' [On sense and meaning] in *The Frege Reader*, ed. M. Beaney (Blackwell, 1997), 151–71

Frege, Gottlob. 'Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung', *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus* 1 (1918–19), 58–77; translated as 'Thought' in *The Frege Reader*, ed. M. Beaney (Blackwell, 1997), 325–45

Background

Morris, Michael. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge UP, 2006), chapter 2 (pp. 21–48)

Further

Frege, Gottlob. '[Comments on Sinn and Bedeutung]', translation in *The Frege Reader*, ed. M. Beaney (Blackwell, 1997), 172–80

Frege, Gottlob. 'Die Verneinung. Eine logische Untersuchung', *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus* 1 (1918–19), 143–57; translated as 'Negation' in *The Frege Reader*, ed. M. Beaney (Blackwell, 1997), 346–61

Putnam, Hilary. 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 7 (1975), 131–93; reprinted in his *Mind, Language and Reality* (Cambridge UP, 1975), 215–71

Topic 3 (Time)

- *McTaggart, J.E. 'The Unreality of Time', *Mind* 17 (1908), 457–73
Dummett, Michael. 'A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time', *The Philosophical Review* 69 (1960), 497–504
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 'McTaggart on Time', *Philosophical Perspectives* 15 (2001), 229–52

Background

Markosian, Ned. 'Time', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Further

- Mellor, D.H. 'The Unreality of Tense', in his *Real Time* (Cambridge UP, 1981), chapter 6; revised version in R. Le Poidevin and M. MacBeath, eds., *The Philosophy of Time* (Oxford UP, 1993), 47–59
Prior, Arthur N. *Past, Present, and Future* (Oxford UP, 1967)

Topic 4 (Perception)

- *Martin, Mike. 'Perception', in F. Jackson and M. Smith, eds, *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy* (Oxford UP, 2007), 701–38
Anscombe, G.E.M. 'The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature', in R.J. Butler, ed., *Analytic Philosophy* (Blackwell, 1965), 158–80; reprinted in her *Collected Papers, Volume 2: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind* (University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 3–20

Background

Crane, Tim and French, Craig. 'The Problem of Perception', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Fish, William. *Philosophy of Perception* (Routledge, 2010), especially chapters 1, 2, 5 and 6

Further

- Austin, J.L. *Sense and Sensibilia* (Clarendon Press, 1962)
Ayer, A.J. 'Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?', *Synthese* 17 (1967), 117–40
Byrne, Alex. 'Intentionalism Defended', *The Philosophical Review* 110 (2001), 199–240
Crane, Tim. *Elements of Mind* (Oxford UP, 2001), chapter 5
Nudds, Matthew. 'Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents', *Analysis* 69 (2009), 334–46

Topic 5 (Scepticism)

- *Moore, G.E. 'Proof of an External World', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 25 (1939), 273–300; reprinted in his *Selected Writings*, ed. T. Baldwin (Routledge, 1993), 147–70
Pryor, James. 'The Skeptic and the Dogmatist', *Noûs* 34 (2000), 517–49

Background

Klein, Peter. 'Skepticism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Stroud, Barry. *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism* (Oxford UP, 1984), chapter 1

Further

- Kelly, Thomas. 'Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?', *Philosophical Perspectives* 19 (2005), 179–209
Putnam, Hilary. 'Brains in a Vat', in his *Reason, Truth, and History* (Cambridge UP, 1981), 1–21
Rinard, Susanna. 'Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense', in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, eds., *Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4* (Oxford UP, 2013), 185–213
White, Roger. 'Problems for Dogmatism', *Philosophical Studies* 131 (2006), 525–57

Topic 6 (Description)

- *Russell, Bertrand. 'On Denoting', *Mind* 14 (1905), 479–93
Strawson, P.F. 'On Referring', *Mind* 59 (1950), 320–44
Russell, Bertrand. 'Mr. Strawson on Referring', *Mind* 66 (1957), 385–9

Background

Lycan, William G. *Philosophy of Language. A Contemporary Introduction*, second edition (Routledge, 2008), chapter 2 (pp. 9–30)

Further

- Donnellan, Keith S. 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', *The Philosophical Review* 75 (1966), 281–304
Elbourne, Paul D. *Definite Descriptions* (Oxford UP, 2013)
Kripke, Saul. 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 2 (1977), 255–76
Neale, Stephen (ed.). *Mind* 114/456 (2005), 807–1222 [special issue on the centenary of Russell's 'On Denoting'; see especially Neale's introduction 'A Century Later']

Topic 7 (Analysis)

*Russell, Bertrand. 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', *The Monist* 28 (1918), 495–527; 29 (1919), 32–63, 190–222, 345–80 [*28 (1918), 495–527; 29 (1919), 32–63]

Hager, Paul. 'Russell's Method of Analysis', in N. Griffin, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell* (Cambridge UP, 2003), 310–31

Background

Beaney, Michael. 'Analysis', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Klement, Kevin. 'Russell's Logical Atomism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Further

Diamond, Cora. 'What Does a Concept Script Do?' *The Philosophical Quarterly* 34 (1984), 343–68

Frege, Gottlob. 'Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffsschrift', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 81 (1882), 48–56; translated as 'On the Scientific Justification of a Concept-Script', translated by J.M. Bartlett, *Mind* 73, 155–60

Linsky, Bernard. 'The Metaphysics of Logical Atomism', in N. Griffin, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell* (Cambridge UP, 2003), 371–91

Russell, Bertrand. *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (George Allen & Unwin, 1919), chapters 15 and 16

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by C.K. Ogden (Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trübner, 1922); revised translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961; revised edition, 1974)

Topic 8 (Value)

*Ayer, Alfred Jules. *Language, Truth and Logic*, second edition (V. Gollancz, 1936/46), 'The Emotive Theory of Values' (introduction, pp. 20–22) and chapter 6

Anscombe, G.E.M. 'Modern Moral Philosophy', *Philosophy* 33 (1958), 1–19

Background

van Roojen, Mark. 'Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Further

Gibbard, Allan. *Thinking How to Live* (Harvard UP, 2003)

Hare, R.M. *The Language of Morals* (Oxford UP, 1952)

Moore, G.E. *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge UP, 1903; revised edition, edited by T. Baldwin, 1993)

Schroeder, Mark. *Noncognitivism in Ethics* (Routledge, 2010)

Topic 9 (Wittgenstein)

*Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations* (Wiley-Blackwell, 1953/2009), sections 1–88 and 134–242 [*1–88]

Background

Child, William. *Wittgenstein* (Routledge, 2011), xiii–xix and chapter 1 (pp. 1–22)

Further

Conant, James. 'Some Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy', in J. Conant and S. Sunday, eds., *Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning* (Cambridge UP, 2019), 231–64

Sunday Grève, Sebastian. 'Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 96 (2018), 168–82

Topic 10 (Names)

*Searle, John R. 'Proper Names', *Mind* 67 (1958), 166–73

Kripke, Saul. *Naming and Necessity* (first published 1972; rev. and enlarged ed. by Harvard UP, 1980), lectures 1 and 2 (pp. 22–105)

Background

Lycan, William G. *Philosophy of Language. A Contemporary Introduction*, second edition (Routledge, 2008), chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 31–62)

Further

Evans, Gareth. 'The Causal Theory of Names', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 47 (1973), 187–208

Fara, Delia Graff. 'Names Are Predicates', *The Philosophical Review* 124 (2015), 59–117

Jeshion, Robin. 'Names Not Predicates', in Bianchi, Andrea, ed., *On Reference* (Oxford UP, 2015), 225–50

McDowell, John. 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', *Mind* 86 (1977), 159–85

Topic 11 (Vagueness)

*Williamson, Timothy. *Vagueness* (Routledge, 1994), chapters 7 and 8

Russell, Bertrand. 'Vagueness', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology* 1 (1923), 84–92

Background

Sainsbury, Mark, and Williamson, Timothy. 'Sorites', in B. Hale, C. Wright and A. Miller, eds., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, 2nd edition (Wiley, 2017)

Sorensen, Roy. 'Vagueness', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Further

Graff, Delia. 'Shifting Sands: An Interest-Relative Theory of Vagueness', *Philosophical Topics* 28 (2000), 45–81

Graff, Delia and Williamson, Timothy (eds.). *Vagueness* (Ashgate, 2002)

Topic 12 (Causation)

*Lewis, David. 'Causation', *The Journal of Philosophy* 70 (1973), 556–67

Lewis, David. 'Causation as Influence', *The Journal of Philosophy* 97 (2000), 182–97

Paul, L.A. 'Counterfactual Theories', in H. Beebe, C. Hitchcock and P. Menzies, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Causation* (Oxford UP, 2009), 158–84

Background

Menzies, Peter. 'Counterfactual Theories of Causation', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Schaffer, Jonathan. 'The Metaphysics of Causation', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

Further

Beebe, Helen, Hitchcock, Christopher, and Menzies, Peter (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Causation* (Oxford UP, 2009)