Publications

This paper argues that the later Wittgenstein's philosophical practice constitutes an elaboration of the Socratic search for truth by question-and-answer adversary argument, which led Wittgenstein to develop new methods for uncovering and resolving deep disagreements. On a methodological level, it is argued that this Socratic method (known as Socratic elenchus) is essentially a search for deep disagreement and necessarily raises philosophical questions concerning morality.

According to the biological objection against strong artificial intelligence (AI), machines cannot have human mindedness – that is, they cannot be conscious, intelligent, sentient, etc. in the precise way that a human being typically is – because this requires being alive, and machines are not alive. Proponents of the objection include John Lucas, Hubert Dreyfus, and John Searle. The present paper explains the nature and significance of the biological objection, before arguing that it currently represents an essentially irrational position.

Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion has traditionally been grounded in non-cognitivism about religious belief. This paper shows that the Wittgensteinian tradition has wrongly neglected a significant movement towards cognitivism in Wittgenstein's later writings. The argument proceeds on the basis of two main claims. First, Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, as expressed in his Philosophical Investigations, clearly favours cognitivism over non-cognitivism with regard to certain linguistic facts about ordinary religious discourse. Second, during the last decade of his life Wittgenstein's view of religious belief actually underwent a significant shift in the direction of cognitivism, which finds its most striking expression in the analogy he draws to the 'honest religious thinker'.

Any moral algorithm for autonomous vehicles must provide a practical solution to moral problems of the trolley type, in which all possible courses of action will result in damage, injury, or death. This article discusses a hitherto neglected variety of this type of problem, based on a recent psychological study whose results are reported here. It argues that the most adequate solution to this problem will be achieved by a moral algorithm that is based on Confucian ethics. In addition to this philosophical and psychological discussion, the article outlines the mathematics, engineering, and legal implementation of a possible Confucian algorithm. The proposed Confucian algorithm is based on the idea of making it possible to set an autonomous vehicle to allow an increased level of protection for selected people. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can be implemented alongside other moral algorithms, using either the ...

This paper offers parallel interpretations of certain remarks in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and some corresponding passages in Plato’s Phaedrus. It is argued that both authors are concerned with the privacy of thought that arises from the complexity of the objects of thought.

From a logical or philosophical point of view, names quickly give rise to paradox. For example, logical analysis may appear to show that the names of ordinary language never do any referential work, so that the names of ordinary language are not really names at all. But it may equally seem, upon philosophical reflection, that most linguistic symbols—if not all—are really names. Both of these possibilities give rise to a number of paradoxes that are difficult to resolve. But epistemic progress is often made by first finding something paradoxical and later discovering it to be true.

This paper reports the results of a user survey conducted by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) concerning some of the digital research tools and resources it has developed over the past three decades. The authors’ analysis of the survey results is embedded within a broader discussion of the nature and history of the digitisation of Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings

The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as 'strong' AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility by arguing that machines can share the human form of life and thus acquire human mindedness, which is to say they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is.

AI & Mind ing research on the human–machine neural interface will yield further advances in the future, so that more parts of the nervous system can be restored or replaced, also using materials such as silicon. In the future, a quadruple amputee might be able to regain full arm and leg functionality, including haptic perception, proprioception, thermoception, and so forth. Now suppose the following three things (which should seem fairly commonsensical) are true. First, the human nervous system, including the brain and the spinal cord, is constitutive of human consciousness. This means that for anything happening in the human mind there is nervous system activity underpinning it. Second, an individual’s conscious states normally include limb-based sensory experience, because the nervous system extends into the limbs.

This essay sets out reflections on happiness that, it is argued, can be drawn from the 2013 film Blue Jasmine. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate a certain epistemic potential of sound film, specifically, in the present case, a philosophical and psychological potential. It is argued that this kind of potential resides in a filmmaker’s ability to realistically represent aspects of the world that can otherwise rarely, if ever, be experienced so reflectively.

This article presents a theory of intuitive skill in terms of three constitutive elements: getting things right intuitively, not getting things wrong intuitively, and sceptical ability. The theory draws on work from a range of psychological approaches to intuition and expertise in various domains, including arts, business, science, and sport. It provides a general framework that will help to further integrate research on these topics, for example building bridges between practical and theoretical domains or between such apparently conflicting methodologies as a heuristics and biases approach on the one hand and one based on naturalistic decision-making on the other. In addition, the theory provides a clearer and more precise account of relevant concepts, which will help to inspire new directions for future research. Intuitive skill is defined as a high level of intuitive ability, that is, the ability to make good use of intuition; specifically, a high level of ability at either getting things right intuitively, not getting things wrong intuitively, or sceptical ability, where the latter is the ability to detect instances of getting things wrong intuitively so as to avoid forming incorrect intuitive judgements, which may itself be partly intuitive.

This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that cannot be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein worked towards the same solution but left their work unfinished.

Thoughts substantive claim and, to this extent, is a useful thing to do if one is in the business of explaining what philosophy is along such lines. It seems likely that, when criticising “abstract definitions”, Williamson had in mind the kind of definition that seeks to provide necessary and sufficient conditions. But that is not the only kind of definition there is. And even if it were, might not such a definition still be of significant use, especially perhaps if one used it as a model–following the model-building strategy that Williamson recommends elsewhere–so that such a definition may be useful even if it is in some ways false?

Thoughts it (including in the case of common-sense knowledge), and an individual may not know something but falsely believe that they know it (including in the case of common-sense belief). In general, Williamson thinks that there are no infallible sources of evidence. He says: Instead of a hopeless search for infallible sources of evidence, we should concentrate on cultivating the ability to recognise our mistakes, where we have incorrectly treated something as part of our evidence.

There is a lot of grandstanding going on today about the ethics of machines.Intellectuals have developed a taste for presenting the question of the moral status of machines as a kind of futuristic spectacle that may become reality anytime now. Arguments that try to persuade us of the pressing nature of issues such as whether machines would deserve moral consideration if they could be made conscious are largely an uninspired extension of moralistic discourse on animal rights. The problem of this sort of discourse is not that some animals or machines may not deserve moral consideration. Rather, the problem is the academic manner in which it is typically conducted.

This volume of new essays presents groundbreaking interpretations of some of the most central themes of Wittgenstein's philosophy. A distinguished group of contributors demonstrates how Wittgenstein's thought can fruitfully be applied to contemporary debates in epistemology, metaphilosophy and philosophy of language. The volume combines historical and systematic approaches to Wittgensteinian methods and perspectives, with essays providing detailed analysis that will be accessible to students as well as specialists. The result is a rich and illuminating picture of a key figure in twentieth-century philosophy and his continuing importance to philosophical study.

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.

We argue that Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective on Gödel's most famous theorem is even more radical than has commonly been assumed. Wittgenstein shows in detail that there is no way that the Gödelian construct of a string of signs could be assigned a useful function within (ordinary) mathematics.—The focus is on Appendix III to Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Part I.

This chapter explores the ambivalent role of creativity in philosophical and linguistic practices, particularly through Wittgenstein's lens. While creativity is often seen as inherently positive, the authors argue that in philosophical contexts, labeling something as 'creative' can be interpreted either as praise or as subtle critique. Drawing on examples from Wittgenstein's philosophy, the essay considers how creative expression relates to clarity, understanding, and communication in analytic reasoning.

This volume is the first to focus on a particular complex of questions that have troubled Wittgenstein scholarship since its very beginnings. The authors re-examine Wittgenstein's fundamental insights into the workings of human linguistic behaviour, its creative extensions and its philosophical capabilities, as well as his creative use of language. It offers insight into a variety of topics including painting, politics, literature, poetry, literary theory, mathematics, philosophy of language, aesthetics and philosophical methodology.

What is philosophy? How is it possible? This essay constitutes an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of what might be a good answer to either of these questions by reflecting on one particular characteristic of philosophy, specifically as it presents itself in the philosophical practice of Socrates, Plato and Wittgenstein. Throughout this essay, I conduct the systematic discussion of my topic in parallel lines with the historico-methodological comparison of my three main authors. First, I describe a certain neglected aspect of the Socratic method. Then, exploring the flipside of this aspect, I show that despite the fact that both Socrates and Wittgenstein understand their philosophical approaches as being essentially directed at the particular problems and modes of understanding that are unique to single individuals, they nevertheless aspire to philosophical understanding of the more 'mundane' kind that is directed toward shared understanding.