Since 2020, I have increasingly focused on the philosophy of AI.
This paper presents an argument to the conclusion that machines can acquire human mindedness, that is, they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is. Machines are defined here as digital computers—i.e., the same type of engineered and programmed artefact as the vast majority of our modern-day computing devices—with the additional condition that these artefacts must be primarily made from non-organic materials such as silicon or plastic. Following a brief review of the history of the type of argument advanced here, a thought experiment is presented and analysed, culminating in the aforementioned conclusion. That conclusion is then defended against a number of objections.
This book offers a concise account of the Socratic nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. It carefully introduces the Socratic method and explains the philosophy of Wittgenstein, both early and late, through this prism. The exposition is guided throughout by reflections on the existential question that both thinkers grappled with: namely, how to properly cultivate reason at both the individual and the societal level. For both Socrates and Wittgenstein, the question of how to think well was inextricably connected to that of how to live well. The book presents a critical assessment of their respective achievements and shortcomings in their common project of cultivating reason.
This paper argues that the later Wittgenstein's philosophical practice constitutes an elaboration of the Socratic search for truth by question-and-answer adversary argument, which led Wittgenstein to develop new methods for uncovering and resolving deep disagreements. On a methodological level, it is argued that this Socratic method (known as Socratic elenchus) is essentially a search for deep disagreement and necessarily raises philosophical questions concerning morality.
According to the biological objection against strong artificial intelligence (AI), machines cannot have human mindedness – that is, they cannot be conscious, intelligent, sentient, etc. in the precise way that a human being typically is – because this requires being alive, and machines are not alive. Proponents of the objection include John Lucas, Hubert Dreyfus, and John Searle. The present paper explains the nature and significance of the biological objection, before arguing that it currently represents an essentially irrational position.
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion has traditionally been grounded in non-cognitivism about religious belief. This paper shows that the Wittgensteinian tradition has wrongly neglected a significant movement towards cognitivism in Wittgenstein's later writings. The argument proceeds on the basis of two main claims. First, Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, as expressed in his Philosophical Investigations, clearly favours cognitivism over non-cognitivism with regard to certain linguistic facts about ordinary religious discourse. Second, during the last decade of his life Wittgenstein's view of religious belief actually underwent a significant shift in the direction of cognitivism, which finds its most striking expression in the analogy he draws to the 'honest religious thinker'.